Insider Threats

<p>List of Figures ix</p>
<p>List of Scenarios &nbsp;xiii</p>
<p>Preface &nbsp;xv</p>
<p>Introduction xix</p>
<p>Part 1. Information Systems: Technologies and People 1</p>
<p>Chapter 1. Components with Known Purposes: Technologies &nbsp;3</p>
<p>1.1. Up to the end of the 19th Century: decreasing transmission time 4</p>
<p>1.2. From the end of the 19th Century: decreasing processing time &nbsp;14</p>
<p>1.3. From the end of the 20th Century: facing massification &nbsp;21</p>
<p>Chapter 2. Components with Interpretive Aspects: People 25</p>
<p>2.1. Tacit knowing or, how do we know? 26</p>
<p>2.1.1. The existence of tacit knowledge 26</p>
<p>2.1.2. Sense–giving and sense–reading: knowledge is tacit &nbsp;27</p>
<p>2.2. The interpretative framework, the filter through which we create our knowledge 31</p>
<p>2.2.1. A tool for tacit knowing &nbsp;&nbsp;31</p>
<p>2.2.2. The different types of interpretative frameworks &nbsp;34</p>
<p>2.2.3. The commensurability of interpretative frameworks &nbsp;37</p>
<p>2.3. The concept of incommensurability 38</p>
<p>2.3.1. From partial communication to incommensurability &nbsp;39</p>
<p>2.3.2. Language linking words to nature &nbsp;41</p>
<p>2.3.3. Revolution changing the meaning of words 44</p>
<p>2.4. Mental models, representations of reality &nbsp;&nbsp;46</p>
<p>2.4.1. Incomplete representations &nbsp;47</p>
<p>2.4.2. Cognitive representations &nbsp;49</p>
<p>2.4.3. Shared mental models &nbsp;50</p>
<p>2.4.4. Explaining mental models &nbsp;51</p>
<p>Part 2. The Insider Threat 59</p>
<p>Chapter 3. The Three Categories of Insider Threats &nbsp;61</p>
<p>Chapter 4. Unintentional &nbsp;69</p>
<p>4.1. The quality of the stolen information &nbsp;73</p>
<p>4.2. The case of apparently insignificant information that has hidden value &nbsp;74</p>
<p>4.3. The case of information that can simply be asked for &nbsp;78</p>
<p>4.4. The case of the information that will help you &nbsp;81</p>
<p>Chapter 5. Intentional and Non–Malicious 83</p>
<p>5.1. Conflict between productivity and security &nbsp;85</p>
<p>5.2. Workarounds, a factor for innovation or risk &nbsp;&nbsp;88</p>
<p>5.2.1. Workarounds are an innovation 89</p>
<p>5.2.2. Workarounds are a risk &nbsp;&nbsp;89</p>
<p>5.3. On non–malicious violations &nbsp;&nbsp;90</p>
<p>5.3.1. Intentional behavior &nbsp;91</p>
<p>5.3.2. Personal benefit without malicious intent &nbsp;91</p>
<p>5.3.3. Voluntary breaking of the rules 92</p>
<p>5.3.4. Possible damage or risk to security 92</p>
<p>Chapter 6. Intentional and Malicious &nbsp;95</p>
<p>6.1. The information is known; why not exploit it? &nbsp;96</p>
<p>6.2. Organizational environment and cognitive processes of committing the act &nbsp;99</p>
<p>6.2.1. For the organization, deterrence prevents maliciousness &nbsp;100</p>
<p>6.2.2. For the employee, moral disengagement justifies maliciousness 103</p>
<p>6.3. Ease of deterrence &nbsp;105</p>
<p>Bibliography &nbsp;117</p>
<p>Index &nbsp;127</p>